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The main concepts of the free energy (FE) neuroscience developed by Karl Friston and
colleagues parallel those of Freud’s Project for a Scientific Psychology. In Hobson et al.
(2014) these include an innate virtual reality generator that produces the fictive prior
beliefs that Freud described as the primary process. This enables Friston’s account
to encompass a unified treatment—a complexity theory—of the role of virtual reality in
both dreaming and mental disorder. In both accounts the brain operates to minimize FE
aroused by sensory impingements—including interoceptive impingements that report
compliance with biological imperatives—and constructs a representation/model of the
causes of impingement that enables this minimization. In Friston’s account (variational)
FE equals complexity minus accuracy, and is minimized by increasing accuracy and
decreasing complexity. Roughly the brain (or model) increases accuracy together with
complexity in waking. This is mediated by consciousness-creating active inference—by
which it explains sensory impingements in terms of perceptual experiences of their
causes. In sleep it reduces complexity by processes that include both synaptic
pruning and consciousness/virtual reality/dreaming in REM. The consciousness-creating
active inference that effects complexity-reduction in REM dreaming must operate on
FE-arousing data distinct from sensory impingement. The most relevant source is
remembered arousals of emotion, both recent and remote, as processed in SWS and
REM on “active systems” accounts of memory consolidation/reconsolidation. Freud
describes these remembered arousals as condensed in the dreamwork for use in the
conscious contents of dreams, and similar condensation can be seen in symptoms.
Complexity partly reflects emotional conflict and trauma. This indicates that dreams and
symptoms are both produced to reduce complexity in the form of potentially adverse
(traumatic or conflicting) arousals of amygdala-related emotions. Mental disorder is thus
caused by computational complexity together with mechanisms like synaptic pruning
that have evolved for complexity-reduction; and important features of disorder can
be understood in these terms. Details of the consilience among Freudian, systems
consolidation, and complexity-reduction accounts appear clearly in the analysis of a
single fragment of a dream, indicating also how complexity reduction proceeds by a
process resembling Bayesian model selection.
Keywords: free energy, complexity, emotional conflict, memory consolidation, synaptic pruning, dreaming, mental
disorder
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Hopkins Complexity Theory of Dreaming and Disorder
Shortly after starting to analyse his own and his patients’
dreams Freud concluded that dreams were produced by the
same neurocognitive mechanisms as the neurotic symptoms
on which he had previously concentrated. He initially framed
this unifying discovery in a “psychology for neurologists”—
posthumously published as his Project for a Scientific Psychology
(Freud, 1974a)—in which he envisaged the brain as operating to
minimize free energy (FE). There he noted that “the pathological
mechanisms which are revealed in themost careful analysis in the
psychoneuroses bear the greatest similarity to dream-processes”
(p. 336).
Both dreams and symptoms, Freud now hypothesized, served
to defend the conscious self (or ego) by reducing FE from
otherwise distressing and functionally disruptive arousals of
emotion and conflict. Both did so via the creation of fictive
experiences and beliefs, forms of virtual reality or phantasy
creating an “alienation from reality” thatmasked and pacified (or
in neuroscientific terms inhibited) the arousals. In this he recast
a longstanding tradition—exemplified by Kant’s (1764/2007)
(1764/2007, p. 71) claim that “the deranged person” was “a
dreamer in waking”—that linked dreaming with mental disorder.
Freud sought to integrate this tradition with depth
psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience, and it has had
many other distinguished advocates in the sciences of the mind
since he wrote. The publication of Hobson et al. (2014)—
hereafter abbreviated as HHF—seems an important step toward
fuller integration. The authors bring the Bayesian neuroscience
recently advanced by Karl Friston and his colleagues under
the free energy principle (Friston, 2010) into a full functional
isomorphism with Freud’s early formulations. This means
that their hypotheses linking dreaming and complexity (also
described as Bayesian surprise) can naturally be extended to
encompass a complexity theory of mental disorder1.
As advanced here this is the theory that the conflicts
and traumas that Freud thought responsible for recourse to
phantasy/virtual reality in mental disorder should be seen
as forms of neurocomputational complexity, and that mental
disorder is the product of such complexity together with
the mechanisms that have evolved to reduce it. Although, I
emphasize Freud in stating this theory it has consequences for
mental disorder that go beyond psychoanalysis, and that are also
relevant to psychiatry. In what follows I will try to show that
this approach flows directly from the account of complexity that
informs HHF, and also to operationalize it with examples from
dreaming, attachment, and disorder.
Also it is worth noting at the outset that this theory is partly
supported by the recent work of Alan Hobson, who followed
HHF with the publication of two books (Hobson, 2014, 2015) in
which he applies the virtual reality/generative model conception
to link dreaming and disorder, urging, for example, that the
aminergic-cholinergic balance pivotal for dreaming also unites
“a wide range of psychopathological conditions” which “have
1For current web resources on these topics see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Free_energy_principle and http://ilab.usc.edu/surprise/. The term “complexity
theory” was introduced by Chris Mathys at the 2013 Free Energy conference
in Berlin, and used in our joint presentation at the 2014 Neuropsychoanalysis
conference in New York.
in common the weakness of the aminergic system.” (Hobson,
2014, p. 51) Indeed, despite his unrelenting criticism of Freud,
Hobson now stresses that his current work “takes up the Project
for a Scientific Psychology exactly where Freud left it in 1895.”
(Hobson, 2015, p. 5)
Friston’s variational conception of FE derives from the
computational work of Geoffrey Hinton and his colleagues
(see Dayan et al., 1995), and differs radically from anything
Freud could have had in mind. Nonetheless Friston assigns
FE the same overall functional role as appears in Freud. In
both accounts the brain operates to minimize FE aroused by
sensory impingement, with “endogenous [interoceptive] stimuli”
a particularly important source. In Freud such impingements
reflect “the major needs” or biological imperatives; in Friston
they likewise reflect compliance with biological imperatives,
predicting departures from homeostasis in a continuously
recomputed overall FE-minimizing equilibrium (Pelluzio et al.,
2015).
As Freud speaks of these imperatives as creating a “demand
for work” to produce “specific actions,” so Friston (2012) speaks
of “an imperative to minimize prediction error...through action,”
using “[kinematic and proprioceptive] predictions” to produce
the “kinematic trajectories” of bodily movement. For both
minimization requires the brain to embody a representation or
model of the world, including the agent’s body (in Freud the
“bodily ego”); and for both this requirement is initially met by
the innate generation of a prior virtual (or phantasy) version of
reality, which will subsequently be modified by experience.
Citing evidence that during the final trimester of pregnancy
infants spend most of their time in REM, HHF hypothesize that
the brain is “genetically endowed with an innate virtual reality
generator” whose working “is most clearly revealed in [REM]
dreaming.” They thus hold that we are “born with a virtual reality
model” of what we will subsequently discover to be the causes of
sensory impingement. As well as innate this model is intrinsically
predictive, and so is “entrained by sensory prediction errors,”
particularly during the sensory initialization attending birth, to
become “a generative or predictivemodel of the world,” operating
to minimize the free energy generated by the precision-weighted
prediction error (PE) that constitutes its sensory input.
This accords with other observations, such as that during the
same prenatal period infants’ facial expressions indicate both
positive (laughter-related) and negative (cry-related) emotions
(Reissland et al., 2011, 2013); and again with the apparently
essential role of REM sleep in early learning (Dumoulin Bridi
et al., 2015; Boyce et al., 2016). So like Freud’s primary process
the HHF virtual reality generator is an innate producer of fictive
(imaginary) prior belief and/or experience, the process that, as
Freud says is “in the apparatus first.” Thus, Freud describes
perception, learning, and action as secondary processes prepared
for by the innate primary process, and set in train by the sensory
impact of birth. Comparably, HHF describe these as aspects of
active inference, the process that implement the transformation
from virtual reality to generative model.
Hence also in both Freud and HHF, perceptually informed
belief and action replace virtual reality in waking life as memory
and the wake-sleep cycle become established, thus relegating
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the unconstrained production of phantasy/virtual reality to
dreaming—where, however, it continues to play a role in
minimizing FE. In both accounts, therefore, the REM phase
of sleep—which although distinct (doubly dissociable) from
dreaming nonetheless yields the most frequent dream reports,
and those that are “long, vivid, hallucinatory, and bizarre”
(Hobson and Friston, 2012, Figure 1)—can be part of the lifelong
genetic regulation of neurological functioning, as envisaged in
Jouvet (1999).
COMPLEXITY AND ACCURACY
As HHF emphasize, the FE minimized by the brain can be
equated with complexity minus accuracy. Accuracy is a measure
of the success of a model in predicting the sensory impingements
that have accumulated over a given period of data collection,
and complexity reflects the number of parameters/hypotheses
employed in accomplishing prediction and the extent to which
they are altered in the course of doing so. From this it follows
that FE can be minimized by increasing accuracy and/or reducing
complexity. There is, however, an intrinsic tension in this task.
The data relevant to the minimization of FE encompass
those of sensory impingement. As well as the interoceptive
impingements mentioned above, these include exteroceptive
impingements on sensory surfaces such as the retina and
skin, and proprioceptive impingements reflecting muscular and
skeletal kinematics and conditions. If we think of these data as
points on a graph, and the hypotheses by which the brain’s model
seeks to predict them as curves drawn to fit the points, then
accuracy would be maximized by a curve, however complex, that
passed through every data point.
To increase accuracy over a given sample is to approach
this goal for the data of that sample; so increasing accuracy
characteristically increases complexity as well. To reduce
complexity, by contrast, is to seek the simplest curve (the simplest
or most economic model) for predicting the data overall. Given
that any sample is likely to include many data diverging from
the overall trend, this must be a simpler curve than maximizing
accuracy would determine. The tension between increasing
accuracy and reducing complexity thus shows in the way learning
that increases accuracy also tends to overfit current data, thereby
producing excess complexity as well.
DEVELOPMENT, EMOTION, AND
CONFLICT
Basic expectations connected with biological imperatives like
homeostasis are woven into the functioning of the brainstem.
Comprehensive motor responses to the FE produced by these are
required for all aspects of thriving and development. From birth
such responses are generated by motoric “prototype emotions
systems” delineated in Panksepp (1998), which also perform
the motivational work that Freud assigned to the drives (see
Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). Watt and Panksepp (2009, p.
98) describe these as “sitting over homeostasis proper (hunger,
thirst, temperature regulation, pain, etc.)” and “giv[ing] rise to
attachment,” which in turn serves as “the massive regulatory-
lynchpin system of the human brain” exercising “primary
influence over the prototype systems below.”
The prototype systems are organized around the
dopaminergic SEEKING system that apparently energizes
purposive activity in waking as well as fictive activity in
dreaming. They include “positive” (and rewarding) prototype
emotions, such as LUST, PLAY, and CARE, and “negative” (and
aversive) prototypes, including the proximity- and attachment-
regulating system that Panksepp describes in terms of PANIC,
SEPARATION DISTRESS, and GRIEF (hereafter PSG), and
those for RAGE and FEAR, which PSG in human infants seems
to activate.
The link between homeostasis-maintaining response to
interoceptive input by these systems and attachment to caregivers
is intrinsic, since human infants cannot maintain life without
continual care. As discussed in Hopkins (2015), the vigorous
operation of the “negative” systems is essential for the honest
signaling of urgent need, so in early infancy both “positive”
and “negative” systems are directed at the mother. Infants’
cries of distress apparently originate in the (RAGE- and FEAR-
generating) hypothalamus and PAG, and they in turn activate the
maternal PAG in ensuring rapid response (Parsons et al., 2014).
These systems should accordingly play a major role in
the overall integration of behavioral responses to PE—
including autonomic and other reflexes, Pavlovian and operant
conditioning, and the working of emotion and desire—
that Pelluzio et al. (2015) describe the generative model as
coordinating over early development. And since the “positive”
and “negative” systems tend to generate inconsistent kinematic
trajectories toward the same original object of attachment;
and since they are parts of an overall structure of emotional
opponent processing (Craig, 2015, Ch 8); we should expect a
significant part of this postnatal co-ordination to involve the
regulation of emotional conflict for the ultimate resolution of
interoceptive PE.
PREDICTION, PERCEPTION, AND WAKING
CONSCIOUSNESS
The most salient hypotheses by which the brain/model works to
minimize PE are those that constitute the conscious perceptual
(or perception-like) experiences of both waking and dreaming
consciousness. A basic claim of FE neuroscience, taken from
Helmholz (1874/1971) is that the brain both actively collects,
and also “synthesizes,” the fragmentary and fleeting manifold of
impingements that generate FE in waking, so as to re-represent
them as the subject’s conscious perceptual experience of their
causes. Thus, as stressed in HHF, conscious perceptual experience
is a form of explanatory hypothesis, that at once unifies, predicts,
and inhibits the impingements that cause it, thereby minimizing
the FE associated with them.
This task employs a vast range of the subconscious processing
that underpins conscious experience. Thus, in reading a
paragraph such as this, the reader’s brain continually collects
visual data, moving the reader’s eyes in saccades that focus the
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most sensitive part of the retina on a series of areas about the
size of a thumbnail on an outstretched hand. The focus thus
skips from group to group of seven or eight letters, falling on
each for about a fifth of a second, while the reader’s brain/model
continually unifies and predicts these partial scattered retinal
snapshots as conscious experience of understanding the thoughts
of the author of the text.
This continual collection of vanishing impingements at the
sensory surface illustrates an “active” aspect of what Friston
calls active inference. The inferences appear from the top level
of the reader’s conscious experience of understanding down
through the neurocomputational hierarchy that underpins it.
Thus, the reader can see in the text what the author means,
without consciously attending to the way the author’s paragraphs
and sentences are compounded from words in accord with the
syntax and semantics of the language in which she writes, or how
these words are compounded of letters, or how the letters map
to the combinations of sounds that enable the author’s thoughts
to map to the sounds of her language, nor finally to how these
sounds relate to the grapheme fragments upon which the reader
is focusing at eye level.
This illustrates some of the hierarchical predictive processing
that FE neuroscience assigns to the circuity of the cerebral
cortices. Roughly, such processing works continually top-down,
bottom-up, and side-to-side, with each level in a cortical
hierarchy passing predictions to the level below or beside, and
each level below or beside passing prediction errors back to
modify the hypotheses responsible for them, so as continually
to minimize error over the whole cortical model of the causes
of impingement at all levels of processing. This suggests that the
levels or aspects of processing imagined in the last paragraph
should be cortically realized in the same way. Since, again
roughly, they also correspond to one or another theoretical
domain in the cognitive/affective sciences of the mind, this
indicates how the FE approachmay prove particularly serviceable
in integrating cognitive psychology and cognitive science more
generally with neuroscience.
As Clark (2016, Ch 2) describes in detail, hierarchical
processing in FE neuroscience is continually regulated by
predictive assignments of precision. These “adjust the volume,”
or synaptic gain, on hypotheses and data (PE’s) over all
levels of the hierarchy, amplifying or attenuating their causal
role in processing. By this means the brain/model organizes
coalitions of processing hierarchies for the explanation of data
as the minimization of FE requires. Dopamine seems a potent
neuromodulator in the optimization of precision (Iglesias et al.,
2013), for example in attentional gain and the resolution
of competing alternatives in action selection (Friston et al.,
2014b; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015)—but with the consequence
that aberrant assignments of precision (implementing aberrant
salience) can produce both positive and negative symptoms
of mental disorder (Kapur, 2003; Deserno et al., 2016; Howes
and Nour, 2016). Comparably acetylcholine, maximally active in
REM, seems important in regulating emotional memory via the
amygdala (Jiang et al., 2016), and so for the role of dreaming in
regulating emotion.
PREDICTION, EMOTION, AND DREAMING
CONSCIOUSNESS
As discussed in Solms and Turnbull (2002), dreaming requires
activation of the same dopaminergic SEEKING system as
energizes purposive waking action, and that Panksepp and many
others also take to be involved in delusion and other symptoms.
Neuromodulation in sleep produces an attending away from
sensory input by lowering the precision weighting of sensory
prediction errors—to render perceptual accuracy irrelevant. This
frees the brain to minimize complexity in REM dreaming, and so,
implicitly, to resolve otherwise disruptive (emotional) conflicts.
These processes too depend upon an appropriate modulation
of precision or synaptic gain—and all seem likely to involve
neuromodulatory transmitter systems, including the aminergic
and cholinergic systems stressed by Hobson.
This implies, as HHF contend, that the kind of hierarchical
precision-engineered processing that produces the conscious
perceptual experiences of waking also produces the fictive
conscious experiences of dreaming. But given the radical
sensorimotor attenuation that attends REM, the FE-arousing
data hierarchically processed in REM dreaming cannot derive
from sensory impingement. A non-sensory source of FE-
arousing data is required, and this would seem to lie in the
powerful arousals of emotion that attend REM, which in turn
seem part of the consolidation/reconsolidation ofmemory.
This accords with the tension in FE-minimization between
accuracy and complexity sketched above. For insofar as emotions
drive overly complex (overfitting) FE-minimizing responses to
sensory PE in waking, then memories embodying such over-
complex responses would themselves be a suitable target for FE-
minimizing complexity-reduction in sleep and dreaming (and
also in waking periods of attending-away from realistic response
to perceptual impingement, such as in daydream, children’s play,
and other activities that Freud described in terms of phantasy).
It also accords in interesting detail with Freud’s (1974b, Ch VI)
account of the dreamwork as operating to condense emotionally
significant elements from a range of memories associated with the
dream.
As we will illustrate below, the elements chosen for
condensation apparently include both recent memories that
are being consolidated and remote emotion-laden memories
rearoused to be reconsolidated with them. What Freud describes
as condensation would thus appear to reflect a collection of data
over remembered and associated arousals of amygdala-related
emotion that could be compared with the saccadic collection
of sensory data in waking sketched above. Given associated
remembered arousals as data, the fictive perceptual experiences of
dreaming could serve to unify, predict, and inhibit these arousals,
thereby minimizing FE (as emotional conflict/complexity) in a
way closely analogous to the realistic perceptual experiences of
waking.
This in turn would accord with “active systems” descriptions
of memory consolidation (Rasch and Born, 2013; for an
early version see Cartwright, 2010, and for a psychoanalytic
anticipation Palombo, 1978). Sleep consists in stages of
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NREM (including SWS) followed by REM, with the latter
characteristically lengthening, and the bizarreness of dreams
often increasing, over the course of the night. Active systems
accounts hypothesize that slow oscillations in SWS effect the
downscaling required for synaptic homeostasis (Tononi and
Cirelli, 2014), while hippocampal sharp wave ripples activate
large areas of the cortex (Logothetis et al., 2012), transferring
recent memories from the hippocampus to the cortical loci
appropriate for their long-term storage (Staresina et al., 2015).
As SWS yields to REM the reactivated memories are rendered
increasingly plastic (Calais et al., 2015; Dumoulin Bridi et al.,
2015; Ravassard et al., 2015), and associated amygdala-related
emotions are rearoused, so that both can be reconsolidated
under the impact of dreaming in a new and emotionally revised
integration of emotion and declarative content (van der Helm
et al., 2011; Genzel et al., 2015).
ACCURACY AND COMPLEXITY IN
WAKING, SLEEPING, AND DREAMING
Following Friston (2010) HHF describe how accuracy is
maximized and complexity minimized over the wake-sleep
cycle, and in a way that accords with the tension between
accuracy and complexity, and the differing roles of waking
sensory impingement and sleeping memory and emotion,
sketched above. During a waking period sensory PE’s entrain
active inference, and perceptual learning operates to increase
the accuracy of the model as it was prior to that period.
This is essential for the accurate ongoing computation of
sensory targets for waking regulatory action. (Helmholz,
1878/1971, p. 332) stressed that “each movement we make”—
from the involuntary movements of the eyeballs and pupils
in saccades through the planned and purposive sequences of
movements by which we realize full-scale intentional actions
and projects—can be thought of as an “experiment” by which
we test the models that direct them in our brains. Thus,
in waking our models accumulate the adjustments required
for accuracy, embodying the increased complexity in synaptic
connections that constitute a physiological load on the neurons
involved.
Then during the precision engineered sensorimotor
attenuation of sleep, processes including SWS, synaptic pruning,
REM, and dreaming reduce the excess complexity, together with
the synaptic connections in which it is embodied. As would fit
such a two-stage process, we would expect the waking stage
to maximize accuracy in a way that overshoots (overfits) the
longer-term equilibrium, so that, waking accuracy assured, the
sleeping stage can winnow back emotional complexity, and as
hard as is required to optimize the model for the waking period
that follows.
COMPLEXITY REDUCTION AND MEMORY
CONSOLIDATION
Such hypothesized complexity reduction in sleep
would map directly to the “active systems” accounts of
consolidation/reconsolidation above. Combining these with
HHF would yield an account in which amygdala-related
emotional rearousal and reintegration in REM and dreaming,
as envisaged in Genzel et al. (2015), would be the final stage in
both memory consolidation and complexity reduction, linking
both with the increases in arousal and plasticity characteristic of
REM. We could thus see synaptic homeostasis and emotional
reintegration as rendering the posterior model of one waking
period a simpler and better predictor for the next. And as
indicated above, this theoretical unification admits further
explication by psychoanalytic hypotheses relating to complexity,
dreaming, and mental disorder.
REALISTIC ACTIVE INFERENCE IN
WAKING
In waking much minimizing of FE via action takes a familiar
realistic form, in which PE’s generate alternative parameters of
emotion and/or desire for action that are entertained together
with the alternative sensorimotor trajectories associated with
them in affordance competition and action selection, and then—
provided they generate trajectories that find their sensory
targets—eliminated from ongoing neurocomputational work.
Thus, suppose cells in the hypothalamus like those specified in
Oka et al. (2015) respond to a predicted violation of homeostatic
equilibrium by generating thirst and a desire to drink, and the
brain responds by computing various motor trajectories that
would slake this thirst.
Such trajectories terminate at sensory targets that Freud
called experiences of satisfaction. For thirst this is the experience
of drinking, and attaining the experience seems rapidly to
inhibit both thirst and the interoceptive signals that generate
it (presumably via proprioceptive feedback). In this the signal
produced by the target experience acts rapidly, and well before
the changes in the bloodstream that will secure homeostasis
and inhibition over a longer period. Such an adaptation
seems required for the rapid sequential satisfaction of desires
in action.
FICTIVE OR COUNTERFACTUAL ACTIVE
INFERENCE IN DREAMING
As noted above, both intentional action and dreaming require
activation of the dopaminergic SEEKING system, in which
aberrant precision-weighting (salience) may also produce
delusions and other symptoms. The simple example above
enables us to see how such activation works in the sensorimotor
attenuation of dreaming, for this is apparent in very simple
dreams sometimes produced in response to interoceptive
signaling in sleep. These make clear that such signaling
yields what we can call fictive or counterfactual active
inference, as opposed to the realistic kind that obtains
in waking.
Thus, Freud reported that when he had eaten anchovies or
some other salty food, he was liable to dream that he was
drinking cool delicious water. After having this dream, perhaps
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several times, he would awake, find himself thirsty, and get a
drink. Many people have had such a dream, and many are also
familiar with its counterpart involving micturition. In waking
from such dreams we intuitively regard them as caused by, and
representing the satisfaction of, the desires we act on when
we wake.
Active inference thus shows a common pattern between
the realistic in waking and the counterfactual in dreaming.
We can illustrate this in a simple diagram integrating some
of the commonsense and neuroscientific notions involved.
Abbreviating “desire” “belief” and “experience” by “des,” “bel,”
and “exp,” and using P as a variable for which particular sentences
that describe these in their relation to the environment can be
substituted (Box 1).
This spells out, for a simple case, what Freud meant by
claiming that dreams and symptoms are wishfulfilments, and
also indicates how such fictions can inhibit interoceptive signals
and their motivational derivatives like thirst or emotion, and
thereby eliminate incipient kinematic parameters that might
form part of a trajectory of waking action. And Freud also held
that dreams exercise this counterfactual but genuinely parameter-
eliminating role in the mitigation of conflict—in this case, the
conflict between the desire for action and the continuation of
sleep.
FICTIVE OR COUNTERFACTUAL ACTIVE
INFERENCE IN WAKING MENTAL
DISORDER: A SIMPLE SYMPTOM IN OCD
We can see how Freud compares dreams and symptoms by briefly
considering the one case from which Freud’s session-by-session
notes partly survive, that of his patient known as the Rat Man
(Freud, 1974c,1974d 155ff: hereafter R). His main symptom was
a compulsion involuntarily to imagine, as in a waking nightmare,
that his beloved father and venerated lady were being subjected
to a terrible torture, in which hungry rats ate their way into the
anus of the victim, causing an agonizing death. This first arose—
precipitating a breakdown into what Freud called obsessional
neurosis—when R felt forced to listen to the repellant story of
the rat-torture, as told by “the cruel Captain,” his commanding
officer on maneuvers, whom R intensely disliked for his fondness
for physical punishment.
On hearing the story R had felt the earth move, as though
a rat were tunneling beneath it, and imagined the torture
being applied to his father and lady. Despite R’s aversion
to physical punishment, one might reasonably think that his
repeatedly imagining people being tortured in the way the
cruel Captain had described to him was a punitive expression
of hostility toward the recipients of the torture. R did not
BOX 1 | A comparison of the pacification or inhibition of desire by a conscious experience of satisfaction in waking action and in dreaming.
Waking action (realistic active inference)
Dreaming (counterfactual active inference)
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imagine himself as administering the torture, but said it was
done “impersonally.” But Freud found that his imaginings could
be understood as stemming from unconscious impulsive rage,
particularly toward his father, of whom the Cruel Captain had
unconsciously reminded him in the episode that precipitated
his breakdown.
R had already shown conflict related to rage in other ways.
In his first consultation with Freud he described how when his
venerated lady had left him alone to visit her grandmother he
had felt “commanded” to cut his own throat with a razor, or
again “to kill the old lady.” Although, R’s diagnosis was clearly
one of OCD, these commands seem instances of RAGE caused
by PSG, in which the rage is also turned against the self, as
by the Freudian superego. In the case of Elyn Saks, as we will
see below, such anger gave rise to severe guilt and depression;
and likewise R was anxious, guilty and depressed about his
rat phantasies, saying at one point that he deserved to die for
entertaining them.
As emerged in R’s analysis, his “wishing the rats” on people
was a regular expression of anger. In the preliminary meeting
in which Freud told R his fee, R had thought (as he told Freud
later) “For each krone a rat for [Freud’s] children” (Freud, 1974d,
p. 288); and this was the first of many such examples. Wishing
the rats seemed also to be connected with physical punishment.
In analysis R maintained that his father never punished him
physically, but became increasingly fearful that Freud was liable
to murderous rage, in which would beat him and throw him out
the consulting room, or again fall on him like a beast of prey [or
again like the rats of his phantasy] “to search out what was evil in
him” (p. 285).
These manifestations of transference vanished when R
remembered and re-experienced an episode from early childhood
in which his father had angrily beaten him for urinating
while lying between his parents in their bed. This fouling had
apparently enraged his father, and R had felt in terror for his
life. Although, R had forgotten this episode, his spectacular rage
at his father while enduring the beating was a matter of family
legend, and his father never punished him physically again. This
immediately preceded the childhood onset of his early anxieties
and depression about the likelihood of his father’s death; and as
R went over these things in his analysis, his “wishing the rats”
evolved into a conscious expression of irritation that he used less
and less, as he ceased to show the symptoms of OCD that had
been related to it.
We can thus take R’s symptom as instantiating a pattern
similar to those above (Box 2).
As this makes clear, we can see R’s symptom as produced by
a dream-like condensation of his current anger at the punitive
cruel Captain with his forgotten rage and fear toward his
father—who was, therefore, the salient focus of the arousal
of FE that his symptom (temporarily) served to reduce. (For
relation of this to the psychoanalytic notion of repression see
Hopkins, 2012). As this suggests, in both dreaming and disorder
the input of FE to the hierarchical processes of complexity
reduction by fictive experience would derive from memory and
emotion, which must in any case also inform ongoing perceptual
processing.
Here we also see a link between conflict, counterfactual
inference, and complexity. When a fictive experience of
satisfaction serves to mitigate a conflict, it does so by reducing
or eliminating some of the conflicting parameters involved, as
Freud’s dream of drinking temporarily eliminates his nocturnal
thirst, and R’s imaginary torture temporarily eliminates the
unconscious rage that conflicts with his love for his father,
replacing it with anxiety and depression. The basic insight here
is that conflict, which invariably has emotional or interoceptive
aspects, can be equated with complexity in the statistical sense of
FE neuroscience.
Such complexity is reported in waking by interoceptive
prediction errors and quantifies the divergence between posterior
(informed) and prior beliefs, where the latter would include the
primary beliefs of infancy or, as above, emotion-laden priors
dating from early childhood. From a technical perspective,
this means that the resolution of conflict conforms to the
BOX 2 | The pacification or inhibition of a desire involved in unconscious conflict by a conscious experience of satisfaction constituting a symptom.
R’s symptom
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statistical imperative to minimize complexity—and thereby
normally renders internal models of the causes of sensory
impingement better able to provide accurate and parsimonious
predictive and regulatory explanations for the impingements
themselves.
COMPLEXITY AND ATTACHMENT
Since the regulatory functions of the generative model are built
up in attachment and discharged via movement, we should
expect the effects of excess complexity to show in relation to
this process. As discussed in detail in Hopkins (2015), we can
apparently see these regulatory functions in action in the “strange
situation” procedure used to assess attachment from the end of
the first year. This is conducted in a novel room (the strange
situation: for further information see Howe, 2011) in which age-
appropriate toys are provided to encourage exploration and play,
and hence to activate the systems that Panksepp describes as
SEEKING and PLAY. It turns on observation of the infants’
reactions to short episodes (reduced in serious distress) in which
(despite their angry protests) their mothers leave them alone or
with a stranger. This apparently rouses PSG as well as FEAR of
the stranger and RAGE toward the mother for inflicting such
distress despite protests to the contrary.
Infants are classified as secure in attachment, or again
as insecure—avoidant, ambivalent-resistant, or disorganized—
depending on how they cope with these conflicts. Roughly,
secure infants resolve the conflicts co-operatively, expressing
their anger, distress, and fear as they occur, and on reunion
accepting comfort and care, and so returning to exploration
and play. Avoidant infants suppress the emotions, expressing
them perhaps only in angry refusal to be comforted, and remain
conflicted and stressed for a longer time. Those classed as
ambivalent-resistant amplify the emotions, demanding closeness
and comfort while also refusing to be placated; and they too
remain longer in conflict and stress.
By contrast disorganized infants—who make up a large
percentage of maltreated or abused samples, and are particularly
liable to suffer later trauma-related disorders—are unable
to adopt any of these overall strategies for coping with
conflict. Rather they show various forms of overt kinematic
incoherence in their behavior toward theirmothers. These include
contradictory behaviors, such as approach followed by avoidance,
or combinations of the two; anomalous postures and mistimed
movements; freezing or stilling; and signs of confusion.
That is: in this carefully standardized situation of emotional
conflict, which reactivates conflicting parameters set earlier in
infancy, the generative models of disorganized infants seize
up, becoming incapable of predicting whether an optimal
sensorimotor trajectory will approach or avoid their mothers.
The only curves they are able to fit to their current data of
perception and emotion here fail to yield a coherent social
and spatial path. The complexity of affordance competition and
action selection in this basic social decision is so magnified by
conflict as to render the required computations too emotionally
complex for their generative models to manage.
Here are two examples of such (hypothesized) excess
complexity, from the behavior of a little boy and girl of 18
months, as described in Solomon and George (1999, p. 131).
In the second reunion Kate approached her mother with
her arms outstretched...when she was about two feet away from
making contact, she moved her arms to the side and abruptly
circled away from her mother like a banking airplane. As she
moved away she had a blank, dazed expression on her face.
In the first reunion, Sam approached his mother with his eyes
cast down. When he was about two feet away he looked up at her,
rising suddenly and making gasping noises with his breath as he
did so. He quickly looked down again, bared his teeth in a half-
grimace/half-smile and turned away. Hunching his shoulders and
holding his arms and legs stiﬄy, he tiptoed to the other side of
the room. He sat motionless in the chair for 30 s, grasping the
armrests and staring straight ahead with a dazed expression.
This disorganization, moreover, bears comparison with that
experienced in schizophrenia. Thus, consider Saks, (2008)
account of her first experience of the latter, brought on by a critical
remark from her father.
My heart sinks at the tone of his voice: I’ve disappointed him.
And then something odd happens: My awareness (of myself, of
him, of the room, of the physical reality around and beyond
us) instantly grows fuzzy...I think I am dissolving ... like a sand
castle with all the sand sliding away in the receding surf. This
is scary, please let it be over!...Most people know what it’s like
to be seriously afraid...“disorganization” is a different matter
altogether...One’s center gives way...
Of course, my dad didn’t notice what had happened, since
it was all happening inside me. And frightened as I was at the
moment, I intuitively knew that this was something I needed to
hide from him, and from anyone else as well (Saks, 2008, pp.
12–13).
Freudian hypotheses would explain these disorganizations, like
that which struck R on hearing the cruel Captain, via emotional
conflicts built into the self by the self-punishing superego/ego-
ideal. But one need not adopt this theory to appreciate them as
instances of excess complexity.
COMPLEXITY CONFLICT AND TRAUMA
As the foregoing indicates, complexity is conceptually linked
with emotional conflict and trauma. Conflict involves the
simultaneous activation of parameters producing inconsistent
sensorimotor trajectories, such as we saw above; and these
would be a clear target for complexity reduction in sleep.
Again, complexity indexes the parametric changes required
for emotional learning or emotional adjustment to sensory
impingement (cf affective load in Levin and Nielsen, 2009); and
experiences are rightly regarded as traumatic when, as in PTSD
(Enlow et al., 2014) or BPD (Mosquera et al., 2014) the emotional
adjustments (complexity) required for integrating them into
thought and action are greater than the brain can manage.
Although, these forms of disorder, like disorganized
attachment, are linked with traumatic abuse (Cyr et al., 2010),
the work of Beebe and Lachman (2014) indicates something
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subtler. Their second-by-second microanalyses of face-to-
face interactions between mothers and infants show that
disorganization at 12+ months can be predicted from the 4th
month by episodes of emotional misrecognition very different
from abuse. These involve short (2.5 s) interactions in play, whose
fine details are undetectable by unaided sight, and in which,
among other things, the mothers concerned refuse to recognize
or co-ordinate empathically with their infants’ expressions of
distress. Instead they respond with exaggerated surprise or
smiling, or again, as distress increases, by facial freezing and/or
looking away. Meanwhile the infants themselves—as in the later
patterns of disorganization—respond with rapidly conflicting
expressions of emotion e.g., whimpering and smiling within
the same second or so; and they grow more distraught as no
recognitional response is forthcoming. These infants seem
frustrated not only by the original causes of their distress, but
also in their desire that it be acknowledged and understood; and
they respond with a short expression of the complexity/conflict
that will later be expressed in approach/avoidance conflicts like
those above.
We noted earlier that infants’ expressions of distress seem to
stem from the activation of the PAG, and in turn activate the PAG
and other sources of conflict in mothers (Parsons et al., 2014;
Dudek et al., 2016). These mothers are apparently so threatened
by PAG-activating communications (or projections) of conflict
and distress from their infants that theymust block them entirely.
This deprives the infants (as their mothers may have been
deprived) of opportunities for learning in emotional interaction,
and so for internalizing in their own regulative models the
understanding responses of others. Instead they apparently learn
that their conflicts and distress are unsharable, intolerable, and
not to be recognized or known.
REALISTIC AND COUNTERFACTUAL
ACTIVE INFERENCE
The differences marked by the terms “realistic” and
“counterfactual” thus derive from the distinct functions
that active inference performs in the contrasting circumstances
of waking and sleeping. All active inference involves selection
among multiple competing (and hence so far counterfactual)
possibilities for movement. But the function of waking
regulatory control requires accuracy in the predictive hypotheses
that implement it; hence hypothesis-selection in this context is
constrained by PE toward realism.
By contrast complexity-reduction, whether in waking
or sleeping, is discharged in respect of previously framed
(remembered) hypotheses (including experiences of adverse
conflicting emotions) whose complexity renders them unlikely
candidates for realistic predictors in future. These would
particularly include hypotheses (emotions and feelings) whose
original parameters were not reduced or eliminated via their
regulatory success, and so remained active prior to sleep. So
inference relating to such past complex hypotheses would appear
to compete with that required for ongoing perception-based
regulatory control, as indicated by the relegation of perceptually
unconstrained virtual-reality complexity-reduction to REM
dreaming.
The observations about conflict and trauma above suggest that
excess complexity (affective load) derives from these sources, and
that the burden of complexity in infancy reflects the emotional
adjustments required for establishing the bonds of attachment
given the inescapable fact that parents or carers are the main
salient causes of both gratification and frustration. This is exactly
the kind of complexity that psychoanalysis finds expressed
in the arousal of memory and emotion in both dreams and
mental disorder; and accordingly we can see counterfactual active
inference as healthy and functional in REM dreaming, but as
constituting pathology when rearousals of conflict or trauma
render it dominant in waking.
As the foregoing indicates, the complexity theory of disorder
as advanced here is nearly a consequence of the account of
complexity that informs HHF. For if the accumulation of
complexity in waking is so serious a problem for the brain as
to require complexity-reduction in sleep, then it would follow
that inadequacies or malfunctions in such reduction – like
prolonged sleep deprivation itself – might foster accretions of
complexity that appeared in waking as mental disorder. In
addition, just as the mechanisms of inflammation that have
evolved to protect the body from injury can themselves cause
bodily disorders, so the mechanisms that have evolved to reduce
emotional complexity in sleep might cause disorders of the
mind or brain.
COMPLEXITY AND PSYCHOSIS
In order to illustrate this, let us briefly sketch some applications
in schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar disorder. A first idea
would be that schizophrenic and manic hallucinations and
delusions are produced to perform the complexity-reducing
function of dreams, but in waking (cf Llewellyn, 2011; Gerrans,
2014; Skrzypinska and Szmigielska, 2015). As an example we can
consider the delusions developed by Elyn Saks, whose experience
of schizophrenic disorganization was described above.
Saks entered psychiatric hospital in a savagely self-critical state
which she kept repeating “I am a piece of shit and I deserve
to die” (Saks, 2008, p. 61). Such self-hating internal conflict is a
mark of the rage against the self that characterizes “introjective”
depression (Blatt, 2004); and when antidepressants gave Saks
some relief, she told her doctor that she felt less angry, and
remarked on “how much rage I had felt, directed mostly at
myself.”
Later, however, her self-reproaches returned in force, and her
increasingly unbearable depression altered only when came to
imagine herself “receiving commands” from “shapeless powerful
beings that controlled me with thoughts (not voices) that had
been placed in my head.” These commanded, e.g., “Walk through
the tunnels and repent. Now lie down and don’t move. You are
evil.” She was also commanded to injure herself, which she did by
burning herself with cigarette lighters, electric heaters, or boiling
water, so that finally she spent most of her time “alone in the
music room or in the bathroom, burning my body, or moaning
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and rocking, holdingmyself as protection from unseen forces that
might harm me.”
These delusions fit the generalizations advanced so far. They
served to mitigate the conflict, or reduce the complexity, of
Saks’ self-punishing depression, by replacing it with an imaginary
relationship with punitive others. In framing them her generative
model behaved as governments or nations (or other groups) often
do, that is, shifting attention (precision) from intractable internal
conflicts (and thereby reducing them) by focusing instead on
imaginary external conflicts. This change from the internalization
to the externalization of punishment constituted Saks’ shift from
depression to paranoia, and effected a temporary inhibition
(reduction of parameters) of her internal self-punishment, and
so a reduction in conflict (complexity) and FE overall.
Thus, and greatly simplifying, we can represent Saks’s
paranoia-like symptoms in a way parallel to the simple dream and
symptom diagrammed above (Box 3).
This kind of account dates from 1914, when Freud wrote that
in schizophrenia, “the voices, as well as the undefined multitude
[of imaginary critical psychological presences embodied in the
superego/ego-ideal] are brought into the foreground again by
the disease” so that the sufferer’s superego/ego-ideal “confronts
him in a regressive form as a hostile influence from without”
(Freud, 1974e, p. 56). In such a case, while the reduction in
internal conflict may relieve the unbearable internal hostility and
depressive pain that can cause suicide, it also marks a deeper
alienation from reality, and a deeper regulatory failure on the part
of the generative model.
In constantly berating her as a piece of shit who deserved
to die Saks’ self-critical faculty was already punishing her
dysfunctionally, for some imagined or phantasied transgression;
so her resorting to counterfactual active inference to externalize
the punishing agency in the “shapeless powerful beings” of
her delusions was a further step from reality. This is why
the externalization constitutes a deeper regulatory failure; why
Freud describes it as regressive in the quotation above; and why
such paranoia involves a deeper alienation from reality than
depression—even though a main risk in schizophrenia is suicide
in the depressive phases in which the subject is attempting to
re-establish internal regulatory control.
Freud remarked that R’s relief from his OCD came with
his recognizing himself in the invading rats of his phantasy;
and we can now see that this symptom, like Saks’ delusions,
effected an imaginary relocation (projection) of an angry (and
biting) part of himself into another. The oscillation between
depression and mania in bipolar disorder shows a comparable
mechanism, in which attempts to maintain internal but overly
depressive regulatory control give way to delusions in which,
e.g., the subject expects and imagines himself accomplishing
wonderful things, and the SEEKING system is again overactive
in a way admitting control by dopamine antagonists such as
haloperidol. A third complexity-reducing response, discussed in
detail in Watt and Panksepp (2009) and Alcaro and Panksepp
(2011), is the inhibition of the SEEKING system itself, as seen
in the response to PSG in infant animals. (This reduces FE from
sensory impingement in a way comparable to the “dark room”
often posed as a problem for Friston’s account.)
WAKING DISORDER AND COMPLEXITY
REDUCTION IN SLEEP
As these sketches illustrate, the complexity theory integrates the
full range of psychoanalytic hypotheses about dreaming,
development, and disorder into the perspective of FE
neuroscience, where they might receive additional testing. But
the theory also implies something further, namely that we should
understand mental disorder in terms of systematic connections
between failures/malfunctions of complexity reduction in sleep
and the emergence of symptoms in waking life.
These are clearly visible in PTSD, and the nightmares that
abort dreaming are now themselves regarded as causes of waking
symptoms, including suicide (Littlewood et al., 2016). More
generally, a recent study found that 55% of individuals diagnosed
BOX 3 | The pacification or inhibition of an intrapsychic conflict (between ego and superego) by a conscious experience of satisfaction constituting
a projective delusion.
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as psychotic (as opposed something less than 5% of the general
population) had nightmares at least once a week, and that the
emotional severity of these disturbances of sleep was correlated
with that of their waking symptoms (Sheaves et al., 2015; see also
Levin and Nielsen, 2009).
Nightmare seems best understood as produced by the arousal
of fear or panic in the consolidation/reconsolidation of memory
that coincides with complexity reduction in sleep. As illustrated
below, complexity reduction in dreaming often begins with a
phase expressing the conflicts that the dream will go on to
mitigate; and in nightmares (such as that by Obama discussed in
Hopkins, 2013) this initial expression causes premature waking.
Thus, both psychoanalysis and systems consolidations accounts
can agree in regarding nightmares as failed attempts at the kind of
emotionally pacifying amygdala-related processing hypothesized
in active systems consolidation above. The correlation between
the emotional severity of the nightmares and the waking
symptoms suggests, consistently with the complexity theory, that
both the sleeping andwaking disturbances have a common source
in aversive emotional arousal related to memory, and also that
the persistence of the waking symptoms is related to failures in
complexity reduction in sleep.
A range of waking disorders, including schizophrenia, mania
and depression, vary systematically with less obvious disorders
in sleep, involving abnormalities in SWS, REM, and the way
these relate to dreaming. As the complexity theory would suggest,
disorder in sleep seem often to predict that in waking (Krystal,
2012; Reeve et al., 2015; Zanini et al., 2015); and cognitive
bizarreness tends to correlate across disorders as between
dreaming and waking. Thus, normally bizarreness in dreaming
greatly exceeds that in waking. In depression, by contrast,
dreaming, when it occurs, is often mundane, emotionally flat,
and lacking in bizarreness (Beauchemin and Hays, 1996), so that
cognitive bizarreness in dreaming and waking tend toward a
level. Something similar appears in schizophrenia and mania,
in which both dreaming and waking bizarreness are elevated
(Cavallotti et al., 2014).
Cartwright (2010, Ch. 4; see also Nutt et al., 2008; Palagini
et al., 2013) describes how severe depression often involves a
premature transition from early light sleep to a disordered form
of REM. This omits deep SWS in which growth hormone is
released, and memory transfer from the hippocampus to the
cortex normally takes place. The premature REM is abnormally
sparse or dense, coming in “eye movement storms,” accompanied
not only by high limbic/paralimbic arousal but also by high (and
likely conflict-controlling) activity in frontal executive areas. In
consequence many severely depressed patients apparently do not
dream in REM.
Taken together with the mundaneness of dreaming in
less severe depression, this suggests that the bizarreness of
dreams partly reflects the complexity aroused and available
for reduction in them. This would accord with Kirov’s (2013)
suggestion that complexity reduction takes place periodically
during successive NREM-REM cycles over a night, with each
cycle potentially broadening and/or deepening the work of
consolidation/reconsolidation of its predecessors. Since the
sources of complexity in remote memory are intrinsic and
inexhaustible, increases in bizarreness during a night wouldmark
ongoing successful reduction; and the bizarreness itself would
partly reflect an increasing use of condensation, as discussed
below.
By contrast disturbances that abort complexity-reduction in
dreaming seem also, as in PTSD, to give rise to symptoms in
waking. As shown by Vogel et al. (1968, 1977, 1980) symptoms
of even severely depressed individuals are altered without
medication by 3 weeks of carefully controlled deprivation of REM
sleep. This causes an REM rebound in which SWS and REM are
restored to a more normal balance and symptoms are relieved.
This illustrates the leading role that the complexity theory assigns
to processes that have evolved to reduce complexity in sleep; and
so do Cartwright’s further observations as to the way the quality
of patients’ sleep and dreaming predicts whether they will recover
from depression. (For related recent research incorporating a
psychoanalytic perspective see Fischmann et al., 2013)
A comparable situation holds in schizophrenia, the disorder
held most closely to resemble dreaming (Llewellyn, 2009, 2011),
and in which dreams are often impoverished or short but
related to waking symptoms (Chang, 1964; Carrington, 1972;
Lusignan et al., 2009; Noreika et al., 2010; Mota et al., 2014).
In healthy individuals the slow waves, spindles, and sharp-wave
ripples that implement the transfer of memories to the cortex
during the consolidation/reconsolidation of memory are tightly
synchronized. In individuals diagnosed as schizophrenic they
are not (Gardner et al., 2014). Slow wave activity in sleep—
which as Cartwright (2010) notes may also be associated with
sleepwalking and night terrors—is abnormal and reduced. This
goes with an increase in slow wave activity in waking, particularly
when the disorder is active, and also with abnormal dopamine
release (Slifstein et al., 2015), blunted in prefrontal but increased
in striatal areas. AsDuan et al. (2015) and Lisman (2016) contend,
this may impede prefrontal working memory; and since striatal
dopamine can also cause delusions, this may also be a source of
delusions such as Saks’ above.
Friston and his colleagues distinguish dysconnection, the
dysfuncional integration of distributed neuronal processes,
usually at the synaptic level, from disconnection, the anatomical
disruption of long-range connections at the level of white-matter
tracts and axonal processes (Friston et al., 2014a). Recent work
on dysconnection (van den Heuvel et al., 2015) suggests that
both may be due to the loss of dendritic spines on cortical
neurons, which may in turn be caused by the removal of calcium-
permeable AMPA receptors in sleep (Lanté et al., 2011; on
mechanisms of pruning see also Gonçisalves et al., 2016). Such
losses have long been documented in schizophrenia (Glausier and
Lewis, 2012) and more recently in bipolar disorder (Konopaske
et al., 2014). Since the 1980’s neuroscientists have speculated that
this is due to synaptic pruning (Feinberg, 1982; Catts et al., 2013),
and this has now received striking genetic support (Sekar et al.,
2016).
Accordingly Cannon (2015) argues that synaptic pruning is a
key explanatory factor in the development of schizophrenia; and
the same might hold, although in a different form, for depression
(MDD), biolar disorder (BP) and others. This suggests, in accord
with the complexity theory, that nocturnal pruning can take
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aberrant forms that render individuals like Elyn Saks less able
to process conflict or trauma in sleep and dreaming, and so
in waking to require the excessive recourse to phantasy or
delusion that apparently constitutes the disorder. Moreover,
as Cannon (2015) reports, it seems that circuit alterations
wrought by synaptic pruning might themselves produce the
altered dopamine release that, as noted above, may facilitate both
delusion and “negative” symptoms in schizophrenia (and would
have effects in other disorders as well); and mouse models (Kim
et al., 2015) may support this.
Synaptic and axonal degradation can of course have other
causes related to complexity, such as the adrenal steroids
produced by stress associated with conflict and trauma, as
emphasized in Kandel (1999) and Altena et al. (2010) report that
such degradation is also caused by insomnia. The patterns of
deficit related to schizophrenia and depression, as described in
Schultz et al. (2012), Grieve et al. (2013), and Gong et al. (2015),
seem to overlap with areas known to be involved in regulating
emotion and conflict (Etkin et al., 2015). This, again, might
extend to a number of disorders that psychoanalysis explains in
terms of trauma, conflict, and phantasy, but current psychiatric
classifications describe as at once very diverse but also liable to
unexplained co-morbidities and overlapping of symptoms. For as
Goodkind et al. (2015) report, a range of Axis 1 mental disorders
seem related to such patterns of reduction.
However produced, these patterns can be seen, consistently
with the complexity theory, as indicating a reduced capacity
on the part of the generative model to cope with trauma and
conflict, and a greater reliance on varying forms of phantasy
or virtual reality in doing so. Thus, both the commonalities
and the varieties in a range of mental disorders and everyday
problems in living may be explicable in terms of emotional
conflict or complexity and the factors that have evolved
to reduce it.
COMPLEXITY REDUCTION IN REM
DREAMING
Dreams could evidently play the complexity-reducing role
sketched above during the consolidation/reconsolidation of
memory, and as already stressed this would fit with recent
work on REM dreaming as performing “emotional valence
re-evaluation and adjustment” in updating and revising the
amygdala-related emotions associated with memory (van der
Helm et al., 2011; Genzel et al., 2015 see also Gujar et al.,
2011; Goldstein and Walker, 2014; Hutchinson and Rathmore,
2015). We would expect complexity reduction to occur
together with the updating of the emotional significance of
old memories, and Soeter and Kindt (2015) have recently
provided powerful evidence of the plasticity of fear memory
under reconsolidation. This suggests that the vivid experiences
of dreaming in the apparently plasticity-inducing circumstances
of REM could have a powerful revisionary effect on the emotional
significance of the whole family of cortically embodied long-term
memories undergoing updating in sleep, while at the same time
strengthening (and without distortion) their declarative content.
This would provide for the maintenance of accuracy together
with the reduction of emotional complexity; and it would also
correspond almost exactly with the understanding of the role
of dreaming in the consolidation of memory that is to be
extracted from Freud. To appreciate this we can observe that
Freud’s analyses of dreams characteristically contain, among
others, three kinds of elements. These and their relations
are discussed in more detail in Hopkins (2015), and include
the following
(i) The consciously remembered dream. The sequence of
episodes that make up the dream, or what Freud calls the
manifest content of the dream.
(ii) Conscious memories and feelings from the day of the dream.
These include the episodic memories that, according to
active systems accounts, are under consolidation in the
dream, and so are the emotionally significant newmemories
that are under transfer to the cortex from the hippocampus
during the SWS that precedes the REM in which the dream
in (i) occurs. Thus, it seems that in the dream itself these
new memories are being consolidated and emotionally
integrated with the rearoused cluster of memories and
emotions (iii, below) already stored in the cortex.
(iii) Deeper memories and emotions (as well as thoughts, feelings,
wishes, etc.) systematically related to (i) and (ii). These
remote memories and significant emotions are part of what
Freud calls the latent content of the dream, as collected
in his process of free association. In that context they
can be seen to relate to (i) and (ii) in such a way as to
provide evidence (similar to that in the simple instances
of dreaming above) for the hypothesis that these are the
deeper memories and emotions that were unconsciously
aroused in active inference on the previous day, and hence
also the memories and emotions that systems consolidation
accounts take to be rearoused and reconsolidated during
REM and dreaming. They are thus also the main targets for
the complexity reduction taking place, as HFF hypothesize,
in REM dreaming, and will thus serve as more efficient
predictors in the next waking period.
Psychoanalytic and system consolidation accounts of (REM)
dreaming are thus closely related both to one another and to
the HHF account of dreaming as complexity reduction. We
can summarize this by saying that Freud’s conception of the
latent content of a dream encompasses the same cortically stored
memories and associated emotions as the systems accounts take to
be aroused for reconsolidation and emotional revision under the
impact of Freud’smanifest content in REM.
Thus, both Freudian and systems consolidation accounts can
regard the manifest dream experience as caused by the arousal of
the same mainly unconscious memories and emotions that were
active on the day of the dream; and both regard the manifest
dream as working to alter some of these emotions during their
arousal. The alterations proposed by both accounts, moreover,
are such as would reduce emotional complexity (including
conflict and potentials for trauma) in the sense we have been
considering.
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Taken in combination these three accounts—psychoanalytic,
systems consolidation, and complexity reduction—converge not
only on the memories and emotions whose arousal causes
dreaming in REM, but also on the nature of the emotional
changes that the fictive experiences of dreaming produced
by counterfactual active inference in REM function to bring
about. This in turn indicates that we can further integrate
neuroscience and depth psychology by understanding the nature
and specifics of complexity reduction in the actual cases in which
psychoanalysis enables us to trace the memories and emotions in
question and describe instances of alteration and its effects.
To see this briefly but with some detail let us consider
the combined accounts as related to a single element of the
dream Freud first analyzed. In this dream Freud met his
former patient Irma, who introduced the topic for complexity-
reduction by complaining to him about her continued suffering
after her therapy. He examined her together with Dr. M, the
leading figure in their medical circle, and other members of
the circle who materialized in the dream. M confirmed Freud’s
conclusions, and the examination made all present aware that
Irma’s continued suffering was caused by a thoughtless injection
of the toxic chemical trimethylamin, administered shortly before
by another member of the circle, Freud’s friend and family
doctor Otto.
Thus, here is (part of) Freud’s description of examining Irma
in the dream (Freud, 1974b, p. 107), with the particular element
we will be considering emphasized in bold:
I took [Irma] to the window [to examine her] and looked down
her throat...I at once called in Dr. M., and he repeated the
examination and confirmed it...[saying] “There is no doubt it is
an infection”...We were directly aware, too, of the origin of her
infection. Not long before, when she was feeling unwell, my friend
Otto had given her an injection of... trimethylamin...One does not
make injections of that sort so thoughtlessly... And probably the
syringe had not been clean.
This imaginary episode was clearly related to two sets of
memories and emotions, as described in (ii) and (iii) above. The
first derived from the day of the dream, when Otto had called on
Freud andmentioned that he had just visited Irma and her family
at their summer place, and while there had been called away to
give someone an injection. Freud asked how Irma was, and Otto
said that she was “better, but not yet well.” On hearing this Freud
felt vaguely annoyed, as if Otto were impugning his treatment of
Irma; and that evening he sat writing out Irma’s case history until
late at night, to show toM, a leading figure in their medical circle,
to justify himself.
These memories are clearly concerned with Freud’s feeling
of being criticized by Otto and his wish to justify himself; and
Freud’s discovery in the dream that Otto’s thoughtless injection
was responsible for Irma’s continued suffering provides both
justification and grounds for retaliatory criticism. So we see a
connection between themanifest content and the emotions of the
day that is similar to those in the simple examples above. Just as
Freud’s dream of drinking and the desire to drink we take to have
caused it are related as desire and experience of satisfaction, so
Freud’s experience in this more complex dream can be seen as
fictively satisfying the desire to justify himself and the annoyance
with Otto that he felt on the evening of the dream. So here, as
before, we naturally take the dream experience as both caused
by, and also as serving to pacify (that is, to inhibit) the emotions
aroused in REM.
In this account the complexity of Freud’s model as he went
to sleep mainly reflected the parametric changes produced by
the small but genuine trauma of this unpleasant and potentially
depressing experience, and his writing up Irma’s case history
until late that night suggests emotional overfitting on this topic,
due to his remote but still active memories connected with it.
Hence the construction in this dream of a radically counterfactual
experience of satisfaction—combining assurance of his medical
competence with innocence and vindication against Otto as
regards the thoughtless medical misuse of toxic substances—
was calculated to produce a prior-restoring (and hence
complexity-reducing) alteration in emotion that would render
his model optimally prepared for action-directing work on the
day to come.
These reflections are strengthened by considering the remote
memories and emotions that are part of the latent content of the
dream. We can see how Freud’s free associations led to these by
starting with those to the element on which we have focused.
One does not make injections of that kind so thoughtlessly...this
sentence in the dream reminded me once more of my dead
friend who had so hastily resorted to cocaine injections...I
noticed too that in accusing Otto of thoughtlessness in handling
chemical substances I was once more touching upon the story
of the unfortunate Mathilde, which gave grounds for the same
accusation against myself... (Freud, 1974b, p. 106).
These associations go directly to remote memories freighted
with guilt and shame: to Freud’s own involvement, as a
physician pledged to primum est nihil nocere, in the advice and
administration of injections that proved lethal. For as Freud says,
they indicate that he felt himself guilty of the kind of thoughtless
handling/injection of toxic substances of which he accused Otto in
his dream.
Freud had been an early advocate of the medical use of
cocaine, and his enthusiasm—which extended to arguing, on the
basis of his own experience, that cocaine was not addictive—
“had brought down serious reproaches on me.” During this
period a beloved friend and mentor, the talented scientist Ernst
Fleichel vonMarxow, had become addicted tomorphine, taken to
relieve incurable pain from an infection and amputation resulting
from dissecting a cadaver. Freud had recommended that von
Marxow use cocaine as a supposedly non-addictive substitute
for morphine. He rapidly became addicted and the decline that
followed caused Freud great grief and guilt.
The “unfortunate Mathilde” was another about whom Freud
had reason to feel intense guilt. He had given her injections of
sulphanol, considered harmless up to that time, and she too had
died as result. This death, moreover, was associated in Freud’s
mind with the fate of his own daughter, who had also been
seriously ill.
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My patient—who succumbed to the poison—had the same name
as my eldest daughter. It had never occurred to me before, but
it struck me now almost like an act of retribution on the part
of destiny. It was as though the replacement of one person by
another was to be continued in another sense: this Mathilde for
that Mathilde, an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth (Freud,
1974b, p. 111–112)
BOX 4 | An initial stage of memory consolidation: Freud’s memory of
an emotionally significant experience from the day is transferred to
the cortex for long-term storage during SWS.
In considering how his associations had led to these topics,
Freud remarked that it seemed he “had been collecting all the
occasions which I could bring up against myself as evidence
of lack of medical conscientiousness.” With hindsight we can
see that this was the activity of the part of himself that he
would later call the superego, which not only accused him
with his worst medical derelictions but also threatened him
with retribution for them in the form of the death of his own
daughter. This was the unconscious version, in Freud, of the
kind of conflict with the superego consciously expressed in Saks’
berating herself as a piece of shit who deserved to die. And
as with Saks, it involved activity of a part or aspect of the
self being experienced as coming outside—not from shapeless
powerful beings such as Saks described, but as retribution on the
part of destiny.
Thus, we can diagram the complexity-reducing function of
Freud’s dream as follows starting from the initial stage of memory
consolidation in SWS (Box 4).
This is followed by the second stage, of arousal of
memory and emotion in REM, as understood in light
of the memories recovered by Freud in free association
(Box 5).
And finally we have the work of counterfactual active
inference in response to these arousals, inhibiting (pacifying)
them by creating Freud’s fictive experience of innocence
and vindication, and so reducing the emotional complexity
(adversity, conflict, and potential to cause depressive trauma)
of the whole family of memories under reconsolidation
(Box 6).
BOX 5 | A second stage in memory consolidation: The cortically stored memories which gave Freud’s experience of the day its particular emotional
significance are re-aroused in REM so that the new memory can be consolidated together with them as part of a complex that has been emotionally
revised (simplified) in light of the day’s experience.
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BOX 6 | A final stage in memory consolidation: The complex
of memories and emotions rearoused in REM produce a series
of emotionally simplifying dream experiences, which enable the
complex to be reconsolidated in a less complex (less averse,
conflicted, and trauma-producing) form.
CONDENSATION AND SYMBOLIC
COGNITION
Above we noted that Freud described the dreamwork (Freud,
1974b, Ch. VI) as condensing emotionally significant elements
from a range of associated memories, including recent memories
under consolidation and remote memories rearoused for
reconsolidation with them. In this example we can see such
condensation clearly in the figure of Irma, whose role as recipient
of Otto’s toxic injection in the dream condenses her with
the “dead friend” and “the unfortunate Mathilde” in Freud’s
associations. This condensation was a form of symbolization,
bridging Freud’s recent upsetting memory of Otto’s remark about
Irma with his temporally remote memories about the friend and
patient who were the deeper sources of his guilt and shame, and
preparing for the emotional whitewash provided by the rest of the
dream.
This condensation enabled Freud’s fictive conscious experience
of innocence in respect of a toxic injection given to Irma to
extend its inhibitory reach to his real remembered arousals of
emotion about his role in toxic injections, and in a way that is
structurally comparable to the role of consciousness-constituting
FE-minimizing inference in waking. Symbolic cognition thus
also plays an important role in the minimization of FE, and
Hopkins (2000, 2015) describe how the dreamwork in this
example makes copious use of symbolism that can be discussed
as conceptual metaphor. Malinowski and Horton (2015) discuss
conceptual metaphor as part of symbolic embodied cognition in
an account of emotion-assimilation in dreaming that also relates
it to condensation and memory.
It thus appears that a key role of active inference in the
construction of dreaming consciousness is to inhibit and alter
adverse and conflicting emotions, so as to reduce or eliminate
the overly complex parameters/states introduced in their waking
arousal. We can see Freud’s dream as accomplishing this in a
way akin to Bayesian model selection (cf Fitzgerald et al., 2014).
The dream introduced an ideal alternative counterfactual model
which perforce realized an ideal fictive sensorimotor trajectory
by which, and in accord with Freud’s priors of the previous
day, the adverse emotional situation precipitated in him by
Otto’s unwelcome remark could be restored to a personally
satisfactory (and free-energy minimal) equilibrium. Thus, Freud
could awake in the morning free from the self-justificatory
and depressive trend in which he had spent the day and
evening after Otto’s remark, and address his problems as a
physician and psychiatrist via the creative activity of analyzing
his own dream, thereby altering his own theories and practice for
the better.
In addition we can see the fictive construction in Freud’s
dream to have played a role comparable to that in Saks’
delusions. In both cases the self was threatened by conflict in
the form of severe and depressing self-reproaches, and in both
this conflict was mitigated by the creation of a counterfactual
virtual reality that externalized the conflict. In Saks the moralistic
agency of conflict (the superego) was externalized by projection
into the “shadowy, powerful beings” who commanded her
to undergo self-tormenting penance. In Freud, this agency
remained intact and functioning, but the counterfactual virtual
reality, as in a manic episode, directed its critical functioning
away from Freud himself and on to Otto instead. Thus,
Freud’s dream relieved his internal conflict while keeping his
internal locus of self-regulation intact and exercised, whereas
Saks’ delusions fragmented that locus and thereby deepened
her illness.
The discharge of this complexity-reducing function evidently
requires the collection/organization of emotionally aversive
memories, apparently effected in the transfer from hippocampus
to the cortex referenced above. As other disturbances in SWS
also suggest, this transition seems liable to malfunction. As
noted above in nightmares the arousal of aversive memories
and emotions renders the dreamer/model incapable of devising
any ideal alternative. Again, Saks’ depression and paranoia both
apparently result from an accumulation of self-directed aversive
emotion, caused, we may hypothesize, by destructive phantasies
(e.g., those of killing babies discussed in Hopkins, 2013) that
made her guilty.
Dahan et al. (2007) report that a kind of “burst firing”
of VTA dopamine neurons occurs in both REM and
waking consummatory reward. Such firing has recently
been modeled as modulated by acetylcholine, which is
elevated in REM (Knudstrup et al., 2016). It would fit the
account here if the complexity-reducing power of wishfulfilling
counterfactual virtual reality in REM dreaming derived from
such aminergic/cholinergic engineered precision. (An additional
possibility is that this is linked with the reversal of hippocampal
theta oscillations, Jackson et al. (2014) that Genzel et al. (2015)
speculate may “provide the milieu” for the revision of emotional
memory in REM and dreaming).
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CONCLUSION
We have seen how Freud’s speculative FE neuroscience
relates to the rigorous and potentially unifying paradigm
now advanced by Friston and colleagues. This in turn
enables us to see how the statistical conception of complexity
employed by Friston relates to emotional conflict and trauma;
how symptoms as well as dreams can be understood in
terms of complexity-reduction; how REM dreaming can
reduce complexity in the consolidation/reconsolidation of
memory; and how complexity and the mechanisms that have
evolved to reduce it seem pivotal for the understanding
of mental disorder. This linking of complexity, dreaming,
and disorder also indicates that Freud and free association
offer a distinctive path—but one consilient with cognitive
science, FE neuroscience, and computational psychiatry—
toward understanding them together. Fuller interdisciplinary
co-operation along this path might well make a significant
contribution to further progress.
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